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Criteria and Information Processing
Aspects of Presidential Security

Report of the OSD/ARPA
Ad hoc Working Group
October 15, 1964

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I. PREFACE

This report is based on a review of current Secret Service criteria for identifying and evaluating possible dangers to the President of the United States, and the manner in which the related information is processed. It has been prepared under the auspices of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Office of the Secretary of Defense. The topics discussed are part of the larger ARPA program under Project STAR, which concerns the provision of technical assistance to the Secret Service over the broader range of problems relating to Presidential security. Recommendations are made to enlarge the present criteria to include potential dangers, in addition to those communicated by a potential assassin, and to improve the processing of the related information. The content of this report is the sole responsibility of the ad hoc working group which prepared it; neither ARPA nor the Secret Service have had the opportunity to review the contents prior to its completion.

II. INTRODUCTION

In early December, 1963, ARPA was directed to provide immediate technical assistance to the United States Secret Service (USSS) in its efforts to achieve improved physical security for the President of the United States. ARPA's initial contributions in this program were drawn from several research tasks then underway within the Agency, particularly those within ARPA's Project AGILE. Subsequently, as the longer term research tasks became more clearly defined, ARPA created Project STAR as a separate project within the Agency to direct this program.

As a continuation of efforts begun in January, 1964, ARPA assembled an ad hoc working group (Appendix 1) on September 28, 1964, to review existing criteria and information-processing techniques employed by the Secret Service in the assessment of possible sources of danger to the President (and other prescribed persons), as set forth in the Terms of Reference (Appendix 2). The meeting of the working group on the day following publication of the Warren Commission report was a matter of pure coincidence.

The working group was composed of scientists and engineers assembled from non-profit organizations currently under contract to ARPA, and included specialists in psychology, sociology, mathematics, electronic data processing, operations research and engineering. Approximately half of the members of the ten-man group were involved in previous or ongoing Project STAR tasks.

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Following a review of the Warren Commission report and the specific findings and recommendations contained therein with respect to criteria and information processing (summarized in Appendix 3), the working group reviewed relevant documents (Appendix 4), the written instructions published by the Secret Service (Appendices 5, 6, and 7), and also held several discussions with appropriate Secret Service representatives. Similar discussions took place with representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, two of the four major sources of information which support the Secret Service. The other two principal information sources are the Department of State and the approximately eight-thousand Federal, state and local police and investigative agencies. The working group learned that the appropriate Department of State officer was abroad; no attempt was made to obtain a representative sampling from the fourth group because of the sample size that would be required.

The working group also discussed the psychiatric aspects of threats against the President with Dr. Edwin A. Weinstein, who has studied the Secret Service Protective Research Section (PRS) files and letters and who has interviewed individuals now confined in institutions following threats to harm the President.

Time and circumstances did not permit the working group to analyze in detail the activities, methods and procedures, records, etc., of the PRS. The group believes that a thorough analysis of PRS files by specialized teams will be necessary to carry out the pertinent recommendations which are noted in

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subsequent sections of this report.

The group concluded that it would be presumptuous to attempt a detailed specification of criteria or combinations of criteria related to Presidential threat, the relative weights inherent in any set of criteria, or the operational implications of any enlargement of the criteria. Similarly, the group concluded that it was also beyond the scope of its terms of reference to define in detail an information processing system. Accordingly, the group considered two broad goals which it believed could reasonably be achieved. These were:

1. To indicate changes in the present policies and procedures of the USSS which, although interim in nature, could produce immediate improvements in the protective system.
2. To indicate research and development programs which would lead to empirically supported and systematically derived longer range improvements.

Both of these kinds of improvements have been considered with respect to criteria and a system for information acquisition and processing. In the case of criteria, it seemed clear that an improved protective system would be achieved by enlarging the pool of individuals to be investigated to something more than just those who have communicated a threat. The guiding principles in this enlargement have been (a) to identify those individuals who are potentially dangerous, and (b) to limit the number of such individuals to be investigated to a manageable size. In the case of information processing, improvements to

the manual system are recommended, as is a developmental program leading to an automated system.

Although there are important social, legal, and economic issues involved in many of its recommendations, the working group focused its attention primarily on questions of technical feasibility. While these factors were not totally ignored, they were not subjected to detailed analysis.

One of the concerns expressed by the Warren Commission was that present criteria for identifying potential assassins seem unduly restrictive (p. 462). The working group therefore focused considerable attention on the problems of broadening the criteria to include not only (a) dangers of assassination or harm to the President which arise from expressed threats or threats that can be inferred from the actions of individuals or groups, but also (b) dangers which exist or can arise from individuals or groups whose threats or actions cannot be anticipated, (c) dangers which may result from a major change in United States domestic or foreign affairs, and (d) dangers which may result from a significant technological change which enhances a potential assassin's capability to inflict bodily harm to the President.

It became apparent that two broad classes of criteria must be identified: (1) initiating criteria to distinguish those individuals or groups whose actions or characteristics are sufficiently threatening to warrant investigation by the USSS, and (2) evaluating criteria to guide the USSS in determining the threat potential of individuals or groups under investigation.

It should be noted that two assumptions underlie many of the recommendations about criteria: first, that the present system for processing information about potential assassins is not fixed--that the procedures and methods employed by the system will have to be changed as criteria are expanded; and second, that when criteria are expanded to encompass larger numbers of people, the size of the group to be investigated can only be kept manageable by an appropriate combining and weighting of initiating and evaluating criteria.

The group could not independently validate the information presented to it and had to rely upon statements by various agencies concerning their operations. Only fragmentary quantitative information concerning the various aspects of the Presidential security problem is apparently available. It, therefore, appears that an independent appraisal is desirable; the group also recognizes that the sensitivity of the problems with which the USSS deals will necessarily influence the manner in which this appraisal is accomplished.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Criteria

The working group reviewed the USSS criteria currently used to detect possible threats to the President and other public officials and concluded that while some criteria are adequate, other criteria require modification or expansion to improve their value for Presidential protection.

With respect to criteria currently employed to screen letters, telephone calls, and personal visits for possible threats to the President (Appendix 5), the group concluded that these criteria are a reasonable and manageable means of identifying some individuals who are potentially dangerous to the President.

1. Modifications to Present Criteria

With respect to criteria for screening expressed or implied threats against other public officials (Appendix 6), the group concluded that some modifications were essential. State and local law enforcement agencies are being requested to inform the USSS of any individual, group, or organization who physically harms or threatens to harm any local, state, or nationally elected or appointed official. This requirement is too inclusive and should exclude minor officials, such as notaries public, health officers, and dog catchers to avoid overtaxing the investigative capabilities of the USSS.

The USSS, in its Protective Information Guidelines sent to Federal

agencies (Appendix 7), states that a threat to harm or embarrass the President or others for whose protection the Secret Service is responsible is to be evaluated by the reporting agency according to the interest, capabilities, and activities of the threatening party in order to determine whether the threat should be referred to the USSS.

The working group concluded that the USSS, not the reporting agency, should evaluate such reports. The group was particularly concerned about the inclusion of "capabilities" as a screening criterion because an individual's capability to harm the President is too closely related to the highly variable factors of time and distance. For example, an individual presently incarcerated three thousand miles away could be released and arrive in the immediate vicinity of the President in less than 24 hours. This same observation applies to the "interest" and "activities" screening criteria. Individuals strongly identified with militant "nationalist" groups (e.g., Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama) could develop a high degree of animosity overnight toward the President or other high government officials as a result of changing domestic or international affairs.

The working group recommends that the Secret Service redraft the Protective Information Guidelines to reflect the conclusions stated above. It further recommends that the word "embarrass" be better defined or else eliminated from the Guidelines and that other means be employed to describe this area of concern. In redrafting the Guidelines, the working group suggests that the USSS incorporate the changes in reporting procedures and format set forth elsewhere

in this report. It also suggests that the information requested from the reporting agency be enlarged to include all information about the individual, group or organizations which the agency possesses, and that particular attention be given to reporting indications of violence, mental disorder, less than honorable discharge from military service, and job or community instability.

2. Extension of Criteria

The Secret Service should develop the capability to identify not only individuals, groups, and organizations who have expressed an overt threat but also those whose motives may lead them to harm public officials without expressing a threat. The Warren Commission, also, concluded that the investigation of only those individuals who have expressed a threat to harm the President is unduly restrictive, and the Secret Service agrees with this conclusion.

It was the judgment of the group that a potential threat also exists among individuals who harbor extreme hostility, or who hold real or imagined grievances against Government officials or institutions. Even though such individuals may not have expressed a threat, it is recommended that they be investigated where they can be identified by means of the following categories. It is important to note that these categories have not been validated to the working group's satisfaction. Therefore, while they can provide an interim point of departure for expanding the Secret Service criteria for identifying individuals potentially dangerous to the President, a program must be developed for their evaluation and subsequent modification on the basis of experience, as set forth in Section III.A.3.

In the interim, therefore, investigations should be conducted on individuals who meet these qualifications:

- a. Any individual who has attempted to physically harm a prominent public official (in addition to those in the present Presidential security threat category).
- b. Members of organizations which advocate or condone the overthrow of the government by violent means or which advocate violence and terrorism as methods of social and political influence.
- c. Those who have stated that they would seek redress for a real or imagined grievance by other than legal or peaceful means.
- d. Any person who makes repeated attempts to gain access to the President.
- e. All callers at the White House requesting to see the President, or any of his staff, who have no legitimate or previously identified business at the White House.
- f. Those who have sought to reject or have rejected their U. S. citizenship.
- g. Those responsible for anti-government pamphlets or advertisements advocating violence.

The new categories (above) of individuals to be investigated should be added on a progressive basis and as rapidly as resources permit. It is clear that implementation of this recommendation will increase the Secret Service tasks and that additional resources will be required. It also appears likely that new or modified methods will have to be developed by the Secret Service to determine the degree of investigation required to evaluate the risk potential of these individuals. While several new categories of potential danger to the security of the President will have to be investigated, it is believed that these categories are significant and that the numbers of individuals contained in these categories will be manageable.

3. Analyses of Selected Groups

It is recommended that the Secret Service initiate a careful statistical analysis of selected groups of people (below) to derive significant indicators which identify those individuals who are potentially dangerous to the security of the President. Conducted on a continuing basis, this analysis should provide the means for evaluating and progressively improving the criteria employed by the Secret Service. The data which appear at this time to warrant careful statistical analysis include:

- a. The Trip Index file (about 800 individuals).
- b. Actual and attempted assassinations (about 200 individuals).
- c. Actual and attempted defectors and returnees (about 40 individuals).

- d. Individuals institutionalized for threatening to harm the President or other public officials.
- e. A random sample of other individuals contained in the PRS files.

These studies should yield:

- a. A set of descriptors and profiles of potential assassins.
- b. A better understanding of the relative significance of particular indicators.
- c. Information concerning the existence, availability, and reliability of this information.

The working group recognizes that the categories of individuals enumerated in a through e above is limited to those who are currently in the PRS files. The group believes that the careful statistical analysis of these cases will result in the identification of indicators which may require an expansion of the Secret Service investigative efforts to encompass a larger number of cases. The working group further believes that this analysis may also identify areas where more emphasis should be given during the field investigation of potentially dangerous persons. When studies of this kind are undertaken, it is important to insure that adequate information about a control population is collected so that meaningful comparisons can be drawn. Failure to compare groups of concern to the Secret Service with an appropriate control population will

make it difficult, if not impossible, in many cases to generalize the results of psychiatric interviews, content analyses, or other experimental procedures.

B. Information Management

1. Present System Improvements

On the basis of information provided to the working group, it appears that certain steps should be taken immediately to improve the present information acquisition and processing system.

The first step should be to obtain a "methods and procedures" review and development capability. Since the USSS does not appear to possess the organic capability to do this, expert assistance should be obtained. Work to be accomplished would include the formulation and standardization of records, forms, and procedures to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the present manual system and to facilitate the later selective incorporation of this information into an automated data-processing system. These improvements should decrease the present work load and enable complete utilization of additional information to be provided by new and expanded criteria.

As part of the "methods and procedures" review, an interim form should be developed for distribution to all law enforcement agencies and other potential information sources for requesting information concerning possible threats to the President. There should be specific instructions on this form and it should be simple to fill out (see Appendix 8 for a suggested form). A second

interim form is needed for standardizing procedures for collecting and summarizing significant information about individuals under investigation by Secret Service agents. A third improvement to the present information processing system can be accomplished by the development of a summarizing form for the individual PRS files. This form should include, in addition to identification data, those indicators of potential danger to the President which are particularly significant, and should be continuously updated. Dr. Weinstein's "Criteria" (Appendix 9) provides a useful listing of a number of such indicators and could be utilized as a point of departure from which to develop the form. Refinement of this form can be accomplished as information is obtained from the Criteria Study (III.A.3. above).

2. Interim Data Processing Capabilities and Development Program

The working group recommends that Secret Service obtain an interim data processing capability from other Government agencies to facilitate accomplishment of the preceding criteria recommendations. This interim capability should be funded and maintained until the system design effort discussed in the following recommendation is complete and the system is installed and operating.

3. System Design and Electronic Data Processing (EDP) Feasibility Study

While the working group concurs with current planning by the Secret Service to conduct an EDP feasibility study, it wishes to stress the fact that a complete information-processing system design effort--not merely an analysis of equipment requirements--is required. One example of the type of feasibility

study which the group believes should be undertaken prior to a commitment for a particular EDP configuration is listed in Appendix 4--"Feasibility Report and Recommendations for a New York State Identification and Intelligence System."

The scope of this study should encompass the full range of information processing activities associated with Presidential security including threat analysis, trip planning, route analysis, etc. The study should also give detailed consideration to such things as: data-base characteristics, sources and rates of information flow, flexible automatic and manual data-manipulation techniques, system reliability and security, media for transmitting, receiving, processing, storage, output of data, and personnel and training requirements.

C. Performance Evaluation and System Training

1. Performance Evaluation and System Training

While the working group did not examine the present performance evaluation and training practices employed by the Secret Service, it believes that some of the techniques and procedures developed by the military services may be applicable to problems associated with Presidential security, and should be considered by the Secret Service. Some of these techniques may be appropriately applied in the near future to evaluate the degree of physical security provided the President, others may be more useful when the criteria and information processing recommendations discussed above have been implemented and an improved system is operational.

Although the present system is constantly undergoing "training," in the sense that its members are being "exercised," performance with respect to Presidential security can seldom be evaluated against a known input. The group believes that improved performance is most likely to occur when the input is known and feedback can occur. As things currently stand, feedback to USSS agents appears to be limited to assassination attempts which are, thankfully, infrequent. Many military systems have an analogous problem in maintaining an alert system prepared for an eventuality which is not apt to occur. These systems continuously evaluate and improve their performance (train) through the use of simulation techniques. For example, efforts are commonly and frequently made by trained military security agents to "spoof the system," i.e., attempt to enter restricted areas such as radar sites or airbases. While the specific techniques which might be applied to the problem of Presidential protection are not obvious at this time, serious consideration should be given to the development of improved training and evaluation procedures.

D. General

1. Augmentation of USSS Capability

To insure a continuing program to improve the USSS criteria and information-processing system, qualified technical support and competent programmatic review must be available to the Secret Service. It is recommended that this be attained by the following means:

a. The provision of new technical staff positions within USSS (with enabling funds) to direct or perform development work, liaison with research and development contractors and other agencies, ongoing system monitoring and improvement, and to provide appropriate orientation to other USSS personnel. The suggested technical skill areas are: (1) system operations analysis, (2) electronic data processing, (3) methods and procedures, and (4) socio-psychological behavior. These personnel should bring to bear an interdisciplinary approach to the continuing development and applied research program over the complete scope of information acquisition and processing activities associated with Presidential security. Individuals with the training and experience needed to create a capability of this kind are not readily available, and it will be necessary to define the jobs so that they offer appropriate inducements to qualified individuals. In addition, highly qualified senior people should be hired first so that they can participate in the planning and development of this activity.

b. The establishment of a scientific advisory board reporting to the official responsible for the direction of the USSS Presidential security function which will periodically review in depth the over-all protection program. This board should bring to the program a fresh point of view and a knowledge of developments in the state-of-the-art in those areas appropriate to the problems of the Secret Service. The board should be a small working group composed of experts in the applied technical areas mentioned in (a) above who can devote sufficient time

to the work of the committee to provide an informed and critical review.

2. Interagency Coordination

There is a requirement for close and continuous coordination between agencies of Government to insure that all information relative to the safety of the President is readily available to those responsible for his welfare. The working group agrees with the concern expressed in the Warren Commission's report over "the apparent lack of effort on an interagency basis . . . to develop coordinated and mutually compatible systems" (p. 465), and with steps already taken by USSS to achieve this capability. The group wishes to emphasize that trends toward the automation of these systems will, in the absence of adequate coordination, only aggravate the incompatibility problem. As automated information-processing systems become more commonplace, it can be anticipated that the problem of compatibility will extend to other Federal agencies as well as to state and local organizations who have large personnel data files.

The group concurred with the suggestion of the Commission "that the President consider ordering an inquiry into the possibility that coordination might be achieved to a greater extent than seems now to be contemplated without interference with the primary mission of each agency involved."

3. Cost Effectiveness

A cost effectiveness study is needed. An essential part of such a study would be the development of a mathematical model which can analyze the adequacy of the Presidential protective system in relation to environmental danger levels.

This model should be capable of evaluating alternative allocations of resources (1) to achieve maximum protection and (2) to determine the relationship of protective techniques, safety levels, and dollar costs. The model would use results from at least the following studies:

a. A study of risk-level assessment. A risk-level scale to specify the relative risk of dangerous individuals is needed for determining the cost of various alternatives, and should be developed from the criteria profiles (see III.A.3). It should be noted that risk level varies not only with the history of the individual but with his immediate environment as well, e.g., the risk of a dangerous man in an institution is quite different from that of the same man in close proximity to the President.

b. Assessment of various levels of danger. A technique is needed to enable the Secret Service to assess the level of danger to which the President may be exposed at any time. Danger level is a function of such factors as the proximity of high-risk individuals to the President, the environment the President occupies, and the measures adopted for his protection.

4. Legal Aspects of Exchanging Personal Data

A study should be undertaken to identify the laws, regulations, and practices which currently limit the exchange of personal background information among the various branches of Government, including the FBI, CIA, USSS, SSA, IRS, and the Bureau of the Census. This study should identify what changes, if any,

are needed in the laws, regulations, and practices in the interest of Presidential security.

5. Review of Investigation Procedures

A study should be made to determine ways to improve the efficiency and reliability of background investigations. As improvements are made in the methods of reporting to the USSS possible threats, there will be an increase in the number of background investigations that must be conducted. Attention, therefore, should be directed to such matters as the reliability of various sources of information, the optimum strategies for conducting investigations under varying circumstances, and the appropriate distribution of effort in each phase of an investigation.

6. Psychiatric and Other Local Follow-up

The group agrees with the present practice of referring possible suicides to local authorities, but it also believes that greater use could be made of state and local resources for other classes of potentially dangerous individuals. It is apparent that many individuals investigated by USSS are badly in need of psychiatric therapy, social welfare assistance or other community programs. In particular, many of the people writing hostile letters to the President seem to be asking implicitly for help. It is, therefore, recommended that some formal method be instituted by which these cases would be actively followed up by local or state authorities in order to support the activities of the USSS in this area.

7. Response to Threats

The group believes that the advantages of answering irrational or hostile letters, particularly the initial letter from a person, should be tested (possibly by answering some persons and not answering others). The nature of the response should depend upon a careful analysis of the character and content of the letter. While the results are difficult to foresee in detail, it may be that responding to these writers would forestall the writer's need to take more direct action (which might ultimately result in harm to the President), and would also possibly gain time for further investigation. Mechanical means for the preparation of such letters are available today.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. System Design Process

While improvements to the criteria recommended above can significantly enhance USSS capability to identify potential dangers to the President, the development of an integrated information-processing system appears to be an equally necessary task. The group believes that the information-system design and development process for the Secret Service can be reasonably well defined at this time.

Although semantic differences may exist, the system design process involves essentially four discrete steps:

1. Information requirements analysis
2. Design analysis
3. Selection of hardware and production of non-hardware items, i.e., forms, computer programs, etc.
4. Installation and training

While each step is reasonably straightforward, an enormous amount of detailed study is generally necessary to complete them. Thus, for example, one task involved in an information requirements analysis is the production of a "System Description" such as that contained in the previously referenced

New York State study. It illustrates the level of detail ultimately required for the purpose of good system design.

In addition to developing a detailed system description, the information requirements phase also involves an analysis of input sources and output usage, the identification of constraints and trade-offs, a capability description, and a general operational requirements study. Each of the other three steps can be broken down into a similar series of well-defined tasks.

The system design effort should begin with (a) the identification of basic information functions and the relationship of these functions to one another and to the larger government community within which the Secret Service is imbedded, and (b) the development of a strategy for the conduct of a program to improve information management. This preliminary effort is needed to:

1. Define internal and external organizational elements to be included
2. Provide time and cost estimates
3. Provide general technical direction
4. Establish relationships between the various tasks

The working group believes that the system design effort, because it involves a level of detail far beyond the capability of the Secret Service

to accomplish with its own resources, should be obtained by contract.

Similarly, given the time constraints and manpower limitations, it would have been unrealistic for the ad hoc working group to undertake a system design of this magnitude. It was possible to sketch out in broad outline some of the basic characteristics of an integrated information processing system.

For the purposes of this discussion, it has been assumed that the objectives of the USSS information processing system are to collect, maintain, and coordinate the maximum amount of relevant intelligence and individual identification data, increase the scope and speed of data service, increase the accuracy and timeliness of information, and provide cost and manpower savings by minimizing the assignment of personnel to repetitive clerical tasks. The design objectives for such a system should include: (1) a central data bank for both normal day-to-day operations and longer range research efforts, (2) a capability for updating and culling stored information, and (3) techniques for retrieving data according to desired formats, and within specified response times.

The design program should provide for the evolutionary and flexible system growth necessary to meet new requirements resulting from expanded criteria, changes in the operational environment, the threat environment, and the state-of-the-art in data manipulation and retrieval.

The initial information-processing capability should utilize a relatively simple file retrieval system. It is reasonable to postulate three files, all of which would be part of the initial system.

The first file would be a simple retrieval file, incorporating the present PRS data bank which consists of approximately 130,000 individual records. This file would summarize individual records and require about 100 machine characters; quick response and random access to the file should be provided in order to identify by name and/or geographic location individuals in the file and their relative level of risk. A priority interrupt scheme would be needed to insure minimum response times. The major use for this file would be in the day-to-day operations of the Secret Service, e.g., checking White House visitors and tradesmen, preparing for Presidential trips, and analyzing suspect mail and telephone calls.

A second and more complex file of the initial system would also contain approximately 130,000 records, but it would include more information about individuals (400 characters per record) and would be stored in slower response equipment. This file would be utilized to retrieve information by a larger number of potential threat indicators than utilized in the first file, and to analyze the interrelationships between indicators in accordance with recommendations of section III.A.3.

The third system file would contain the largest number of subjects and provide a data bank for storing information on individuals who have not yet

been assessed as to threat. As additional information is entered into this file, each individual record would be compared against the set of initiating criteria, developed as part of section III.A.3., until a pre-determined threshold is reached which would automatically cause the individual's record to be brought to the attention of the Secret Service for further investigation and evaluation and possible inclusion in files 1 and 2.

A fully developed system may well include: (a) an automated multi-characteristic file index, compatible with other federal agency indices, for information search, correlation, and analysis; (2) an automated summary file, including brief textual material, photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting facsimiles; (3) a communication system for transmitting information requests, acknowledgments, and partial or complete summary files between the central installation, remote system elements, and external agencies; (4) an automated White House visitors identification system; (5) an automated word-and-syntax data association and retrieval system; and (6) a manual dossier file for complete historical records.

V. SCHEDULE

The working group recognizes that the recommendations set forth in Section III are complex and interrelated, and that they will necessitate the application of different types of resources and require varying lengths of time to accomplish.

The group believes that criteria recommendations III.A.1. and III.A.2., and portions of the information processing recommendations III.B.1. and III.B.2. can be initiated by the Secret Service utilizing its own resources, possibly aided by ad hoc working groups from other Government agencies. However, the remainder of the recommendations, particularly those relating to the design of an information processing system (III.B.3.) must be obtained by the Secret Service from other sources, for the reasons outlined in the recommendations and as discussed in Section IV.

If adopted by the Secret Service, some of these recommendations can be accomplished in a matter of months. The implementation of other recommendations, however, cannot be accomplished immediately as they will require the previous initiation or completion of related recommendations. The working group has attempted to indicate some of these scheduling constraints in the attached planning guide.

Report Section	Recommendations	Suggested Timing											
		1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
III A 1	Modifications to Present Criteria	S	O										C
III A 2	Extension of Criteria	S	I										C
III A 3	Analyses of Selected Groups: Criteria Studies												
III B 1	"Methods and Procedures" review and development capability	S	O										E
III B 1	Request information forms--standardization of present records, forms and procedures for state and local law enforcement agencies and other potential information sources	S	O										E
III B 1	U.S. Secret Service agent request information forms	S	O										E
III B 1	Instructions sheet for collecting and summarizing information on individuals under investigation	S	O										E
III B 2	Interim Data Processing Capabilities and Development Program	S	I										until system installed and operating
III B 3	System Design and Electronic Data Processing (EDP) Feasibility Study	S											E
III C 1	Performance Evaluation and System Training	S											C
III D 1a	USSS new technical staff positions; funds for development work; liaison with research and development contractors and other agencies	S											E
III D 1b	Establish a scientific advisory board	S											E
III D 2	Interagency Coordination	S											C
III D 3	Cost Effectiveness studies	S											C
III D 3a	Study of Risk-Level Assessment	S											C
III D 3b	Assessment of Various Levels of Danger	S											C
III D 4	Legal Aspects of Exchanging Personal Data	S											C
III D 5	Review of Investigation Procedures	S											C
III D 6	Psychiatric and Other Local Follow-up	S											C
III D 7	Response to Threats: Test	S											C

S = Start
 O = Partial Output
 I = Input
 R = Begin Refinement
 E = End

C = Continuing Task

Appendix 1

Project STAR
Ad hoc Criteria and Information Processing
Participants in the Working Group

Project STAR
Ad hoc Criteria and Information Processing
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Appendix 2

Terms of Reference

Project STAR
Ad hoc Criteria and Information Processing
Working Group

Terms of ReferenceProject STAR
Ad hoc Criteria and Information Processing
Working GroupI. Summary

The ad hoc working group has been assembled to review the existing criteria and information processing techniques employed in the assessment of possible sources of danger to the President (and others, as prescribed). On the basis of this review, the working group will develop recommendations for improving the collection, processing and evaluation of data relating to Presidential security and will evaluate the feasibility of creating an improved information-processing system incorporating electronic data-processing equipment. A consideration of suitable methods for reviewing and evaluating these criteria and the information-processing system is an inherent part of the task.

II. Task Performance

In the course of performing this assignment, the ad hoc working group will

1. Review the existing criteria established by the Secret Service for the collection and evaluation of such data.
 2. Review the existing information-processing techniques employed by the Secret Service and other appropriate federal agencies.
- 

3. Review the findings of the Warren Commission as they relate to this task.
4. Review other relevant studies and reports.
5. Identify other existing data sources and information-processing systems applicable to the task.
6. Examine the feasibility and the means of adapting or creating improved criteria and information-processing systems whereby the Secret Service:
 - a. Acquires information concerning actual or potential dangers to the person of the President.
 - b. Evaluates such information.
 - c. Correlates this information with that obtained from various sources.
 - d. Disseminates this information to the federal, state and local agencies periodically involved in the various aspects of Presidential security.
7. Identify the validation and system testing requirements inherent in the criteria and information-processing tasks.

III. Criteria

With respect to the Criteria portion of the task to be performed by

the working group, the following guidelines will apply:

1. Dangers to the President to be considered include those from other sources as well as those resulting from specific threats by individuals.
2. It is to be assumed that
 - a. The Secret Service and other participating agencies will pursue an increasingly active program to identify potential dangers to Presidential security.
 - b. The required resources of the Federal Government will be made available for the job of protecting the President.
 - c. The specific resources necessary to improve the collection, processing, evaluation, correlation and dissemination of information relating to Presidential security will become available over a period of several years.
 - d. The determination of the specific resources required will be made to a substantial degree on an analysis of the "degree of confidence" which they will provide that the danger can be identified and the severity of the danger assessed on a timely basis.
3. It is to be assumed that the Committee appointed by the President will subsequently provide guidance which will further define the

general nature of the domestic and foreign dangers to Presidential security. In the interim, the ad hoc working group will consider these to include

- a. Dangers of assassination or harm to the President which arise from threats which are either expressed or can be inferred from the actions of individuals or groups.
 - b. Dangers which exist or can arise from individuals or groups similarly motivated or directed, but where the communication of an expressed or inferred threat to take such action would not be anticipated.
 - c. Dangers which may result from a major change in United States domestic or foreign affairs.
 - d. Dangers which may result from a significant technological change which enhances a potential assassin's capability to inflict bodily harm to the President.
4. Preliminary and periodic means must be identified for reviewing and evaluating the Criteria.

IV. Information Processing

With respect to the Information Processing portion of the task to be performed by the working group, the following guidelines will apply

1. In developing recommended information-processing procedures, every effort should be made to develop these procedures into a system

[REDACTED]

which will be compatible with those of the agencies from which most of the information will originate. The federal agencies primarily involved at the present time are the Secret Service, F.B.I., C.I.A., and Department of State. It is conceivable that other elements of the Federal Government will also be more directly involved in the future; these may include the Military Departments, Selective Service, Post Office, H.E.W., Veterans Administration, Social Security, Internal Revenue Service. Other investigative and law enforcement elements of the Federal Government, as well as those of state and local governments, can be expected to participate to a greater degree than at present.

2. Improvements to and integration of existing information-processing systems will be developed over a period of time, and on an evolutionary basis. The initial effort of the ad hoc working group's efforts in this area should be directed toward identifying improvements which can be made to the collection, processing and evaluation of information currently flowing into the Secret Service and that information already existing in its files. It should then consider the subsequent steps which could be taken to improve the interconnections of this system with those other agencies involved with the Presidential security task.
 3. It is to be assumed that information relating to the potential danger of an individual or group which is contained in the records
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

of other federal agencies will be made readily available to the Secret Service and that appropriate Executive Orders and/or legislative action will achieve this capability in such federal agencies where it may not now exist.

4. Systems and procedures for periodically evaluating the capability of the Presidential security information processing-system will be required and recommendations to achieve this capability are a part of the ad hoc working group's task.

R. C. Phelps
Chairman

[REDACTED]

Appendix 3

Recommendations of the Warren Commission Regarding
Criteria and Information Processing

Recommendations of the Warren Commission Regarding
Criteria and Information Processing

The substance of the Warren Commission recommendations with respect to criteria and information processing are quoted below:

- "1. The Secret Service should develop as quickly as possible more useful and precise criteria defining those potential threats to the President which should be brought to its attention by other agencies. The criteria should, among other additions, provide for prompt notice to the Secret Service of all returned defectors" (page 26).
- "2. The Secret Service should expedite its current plans to utilize the most efficient data-processing techniques" (page 26).

The Warren Commission described the basis for the recommendations set forth above, in several portions of its report. The principal thrust of these comments are summarized below.

The criteria of the F.B.I. and of the Secret Service are described in Chapter VIII, and the following comments are made:

"While these tentative criteria are a step in the right direction, they seem unduly restrictive in continuing to require some manifestation of animus against a government official . . ." (p. 462).

"It is apparent that a good deal of further consideration and experimentation will be required before adequate criteria can be

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framed. The Commission recognizes that no set of meaningful criteria will yield the names of all potential assassins. Charles J. Guiteau, Leon F. Czolgosz, John Schrank, and Guiseppe Zangara--four assassins or would-be assassins--were all men who acted alone in their criminal acts against our leaders. None had a serious record of prior violence. Each of them was a failure in his work and in his relations with others, a victim of delusions and fancies which led to the conviction that society and its leaders had combined to thwart him. It will require every available resource of our government to devise a practical system which has any reasonable possibility of revealing such malcontents" (p. 463).

"Unless the Secret Service is able to deal rapidly and accurately with a growing body of data, the increased information supplied by other agencies will be wasted. PRS must develop the capacity to classify its subjects on a more sophisticated basis than the present geographic breakdown. Its present manual filing system is obsolete; it makes no use of the recent developments in automatic data processing which are widely used in the business world and in other government offices.

"The Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury now recognize this critical need. In the planning document currently under review by the Bureau of the Budget, the Department recommends that it be permitted to hire five qualified persons 'to plan and

[REDACTED]

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develop a workable and efficient automated file and retrieval system.' Also the Department requests the sum of \$100,000 to conduct a detailed feasibility study; this money would be used to compensate consultants, to lease standard equipment or to purchase specially designed pilot equipment. On the basis of such a feasibility study, the Department hopes to design a practical system which will fully meet the needs of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service.

"The Commission recommends that prompt and favorable consideration be given to this request. The Commission further recommends that the Secret Service coordinate its planning as closely as possible with all of the federal agencies from which it receives information. The Secret Service should not and does not plan to develop its own intelligence gathering facilities to duplicate the existing facilities of other federal agencies. In planning its data-processing techniques, the Secret Service should attempt to develop a system compatible with those of the agencies from which most of its data will come" (p. 464).

Appendix 4
List of Relevant Documents

List of Relevant Documents

- Chief Justice Earl Warren et al, Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964.
- Department of the Treasury, Planning Document, August 1964.
- Leon Goure, A "Political" Threat File--Problems and Criteria (U), RM-4124-ARPA, The RAND Corporation, May 1964 (Secret).
- Paul Armer, Project STAR: Information Processing (U), RM-4146-ARPA, The RAND Corporation, May 1964 (Secret).
- Edwin A. Weinstein, Socio-Psychiatric Aspects of Threats Against the President (U), The Washington School of Psychiatry, June 1964.
- David A. Rothstein, The Presidential Assassination Syndrome, U. S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri.
- James J. Rowley, Criteria for Local Law Enforcement Regarding Secret Service Protective Functions, Treasury Department memorandum to special agents in charge and resident agents, August 26, 1964.
- E. W. Geddes, R. L. Emrich, and J. F. McMurrer, Feasibility Report and Recommendations for a New York State Identification and Intelligence System, RM-LO-1000/600/00, System Development Corporation, November 1963.
- Anon. Name Retrieval System, a Proposal for the Secret Service, International Business Machines Corporation, April 1964.
- Anon. Security Protection of a Chief of State (U), (Confidential).

[REDACTED]

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Appendix 5
USSS Criteria for White House Mail
and Callers

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Appendix 6
Instructions Issued to USSS Agents and Regional Offices

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Instructions Issued to USSS Agents and Regional Offices

C O P Y

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
United States Secret Service
Washington, D. C. 20220

Office of the Chief

August 26, 1964

610.0

MEMORANDUM

To : Special Agents in Charge
And Resident Agents

From : Chief

Subject: Criteria for Local Law Enforcement Regarding
Secret Service Protective Functions

Attached is a sample letter which is the criteria we have formulated for local law enforcement to insure that we receive certain vital information. You should address such a letter to all local, county, and state law enforcement agencies in your district. These will include Chiefs of Police, Sheriffs, State Police, and any others you deem necessary.

While I realize that it will entail considerable clerical work the letters to these officials will not be duplicated and an original will be sent to each official.

It is imperative that this phase of our program be expedited, and you should advise this office not later than November 1, 1964, of its completion. At that time furnish Headquarters with the number of letters sent to law-enforcement officials in your district.

(signed) James J. Rowley

Attachment

C O P Y

C O P Y

S A M P L E L E T T E R

(Name
Chief of Police
City)

610.0

The United States Secret Service is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President, or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice President-elect, together with a former President, at his request, for a reasonable period after he leaves office.

Effective liaison with all law enforcement and intelligence agencies is necessary to insure that we receive information on individuals or groups of individuals who pose a potential threat to the safety of the President and others for whose protection the Secret Service is responsible.

Basically, the Secret Service should be furnished with any information coming to your attention of a threat to physically harm the President, or others named above, or to cause him or them any embarrassment, whether it is by an individual or a group or organization.

We are further interested in receiving any information of any individual or group of individuals who physically harms or threatens to harm any of your local, state, or nationally elected or appointed officials. In connection with this type of information we would like to receive any detailed data your file might contain concerning any such individual, such as his background, mental condition, propensity for violence, possession of arms, etc.

Should any information of the above nature come to your attention, please forward same to the undersigned. Any matter of an urgent nature involving a threat to the life of the President or others named in the first paragraph should be communicated to this office by telephone (collect if long distance).

Your cooperation in these matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

(Local Field Office
Address & Telephone Number)

Special Agent in Charge

C O P Y

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Appendix 7
Sample Guidelines Distributed
to Federal Agencies

Sample Guidelines Distributed
to Federal Agencies

C O P Y

June 15, 1964

Mr. Dwight A. Avis
Director, Alcohol and Tobacco
Tax Division
Internal Revenue Service
Treasury Department
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Director:

We have formulated the attached guidelines for the use of law enforcement and intelligence agencies for the referral of information to assist us in the fulfillment of our protective responsibilities.

Studies are now underway by which we hope to develop more detailed criteria. Our experience with the attached guidelines will also be carefully evaluated with a view toward amendment, if required.

We will appreciate your cooperation and suggestions concerning these guidelines so that the person of the President will be protected to the best of our combined abilities and resources.

Referrals should be directed to the Headquarters of U. S. Secret Service, Room 1434, Main Treasury Building, Washington, D. C. Information of an emergency nature should immediately be communicated to any of the Secret Service Field Offices on the attached list.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) James J. Rowley

James J. Rowley

Encls. 2.

C O P Y

C O P Y

June, 1964

U. S. Secret Service -- Protective Information Guidelines

The United States Secret Service is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the responsibility of protecting the President of the United States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President, or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, and the Vice President-elect, together with a former President, at his request, for a reasonable period after he leaves office.

Effective liaison with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies of the Federal Government is necessary to insure that we receive information on individuals or groups of individuals which pose a potential threat to the safety of the Chief Executive and others for whose protection the Secret Service is responsible. Likewise, it is essential for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to know what types of information should be furnished.

Basically, the Secret Service should be furnished with any information coming to the attention of an agency of a threat to physically harm the President, or others named above, or to cause him or them embarrassment, whether it is by an individual or a group or organization.

Beyond the basic type of information -- a threat to harm or embarrass -- three factors must be considered in determining what other types of information are desired. The three factors are:

1. Interest of the individual or organization.
2. Capabilities of the individual or organization.
3. Activities of the individual or organization.

The interest of the individual or organization is the prime factor to be considered in the criteria but must be coupled with the capability and activity of the individual or organization in any determination for referral to the Secret Service.

The interest must be toward the President, or others named, or other high government official in the nature of a complaint coupled with an expressed or

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implied determination to use a means, other than legal or peaceful, to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined.

After the interest phase of the criteria is met, then the activity, which encompasses previous history (i.e., mental instability, history of violence) and the capability of the individual or organization for furthering this interest will dictate whether the case should be referred to the Secret Service.

In making referrals to the Secret Service, it is requested that the agency furnish all pertinent background information relating to each of the three-factor criteria.

C O P Y

Appendix 8
Suggested Version of A Threat Report Form

Suggested Version of A Threat Report Form

The Threat Report Form shown below is intended to illustrate the instructions and format of such a report following completion of the related study recommended in the body of the report.

Threat Report Form

Purpose of making a report

The Secret Service is charged by law with the responsibility of protecting the President of the U. S. and certain other high government officials. The purpose of reporting a possible threat is that it gives the Secret Service preliminary information concerning the steps it may have to take to protect the President, or other officials, before anything serious can happen.

The information requested in this report can be preliminary in nature; it need not be corroborated before making a report. The Secret Service will take all the necessary steps required to evaluate the information contained in this report as well as the steps required to protect the President.

Tell your supervisor that you are making this report so that any and all local law enforcement procedures that may be required can be put into effect. Above all, see that the information is sent immediately to the Secret Service.

What constitutes a threat

A threat consists of any statement made by any person that he wishes physically to harm the President, or other officials named below; or knowledge

[REDACTED]

that some other individuals may be planning to harm the President. The threat may be expressed in a letter, telephone call, or conversation. The threat may also be expressed by actions which by their nature may lead one to suspect that another person may be planning to harm a government official. It is not suggested that such an assessment is easy to make nor that it will always be accurate. Here, it is emphasized that the Secret Service wants to know about all possible threats to the President, whether they consist of words or actions, before they may go far enough to become dangerous.

To whom this report should be sent

This report should be telephoned immediately and then sent in writing to the nearest Secret Service Field Agent. The Special Agent-in-charge of this area is _____. His telephone number is _____; if desired, call collect. His office is located at _____.

Persons against whom a threat should be reported

URGENT: Any threat to harm:

The President of the United States

Any members of the President's immediate family

The President-elect

The Vice-President

Any officer next in the order of succession to
the office of President

The Vice-President-elect

Former Presidents of the United States

[REDACTED]

IMPORTANT: Any threat to harm any local, state, or national official, whether elected or appointed. For example, elected officials include, but are not limited to: Governors, Senators, Representatives, Mayors, Aldermen, County Prosecutors; and appointed officials include: Cabinet Members, heads of the FAA, AID, FBI, CIA, Military Services.

Information to be reported

We are interested in any information that will permit us to find out how serious this threat may be. An attempt should be made to provide the following information at once. More complete information can be provided later.

1. The incident

WHO said (or did):

WHAT:

TO WHOM:

WHEN:

WHERE:

2. Identification of the individual making the threat

NAME:

SEX:

AGE:

HEIGHT:

WEIGHT:

(If available)

DOB:

ADDRESS:

SOC. SEC. NO.:

3. Seriousness of the threat

(If known)

Could this person actually harm the President?

WHEN?

HOW?

WHERE?

4. Any other useful information

Witnesses to incident:

Any others involved in the threat:

5. Person making the report

NAME:

TELEPHONE NO.:

OFFICIAL POSITION:

ADDRESS:

DATE:

Appendix 9

Preliminary Criteria for Evaluating an Overt Threat
Prepared by Dr. Edwin A. Weinstein

Preliminary Criteria for Evaluating an Overt Threat
Prepared by Dr. Edwin A. Weinstein

C O P Y

CRITERIA

A. The Communication.

I Type, Origin and Destination

Letter, phone call, verbal statement to the President
to Government Agency
to others
from hospital, prison,
casual setting.

Coherent or non-coherent
Literate or non-literate
Signed or unsigned
Fictitious name or not
Signed with affiliations or pseudo-affiliations (white race,
Representative of God) or not

II Pattern of Verbal Violence

- a) Threat or no threat
Type of Threat --
absolute or conditional
explicit or implied
- b) Other Patterns
 - 1) Threats to others
 - 2) Attribution of violent acts or intent to others
 - 3) Requests for protection for self
 - 4) Threats of suicide
 - 5) Warnings, concerns, predictions and premonitions of President's death
 - 6) Delusions and confabulations of President's death
 - 7) Idiomatic use of violent language as "stab in the back"

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III Other Symbolic Content

Political ideology, Communisms, Government institutions
Race and color
Religion
Family
Sex (including obscenity)
Work and occupation
Science and technology
Mental illness
Health
Food

IV Problem if structured by subject
as separation from service, unemployment, poor health.B. Biographical Data

- 1) Age, birthplace, aliases
- 2) Parental occupation, provenance, religion, education, death or separation of parent
- 3) Marital status
- 4) Education, literacy
- 5) Occupation
- 6) Military service -- branch, duration, type of separation
- 7) Previous hospitalization in Federal, State or Veterans installation
- 8) Police record
- 9) Homicidal gestures
- 10) Suicidal gestures
- 11) Affiliations
 - a) Family
 - b) Community
 - c) Occupational group
 - d) Political group
 - e) Church group

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Appendix 9

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C. Personal interview

- 1) Denial of threat or not
- 2) Repetition of threat
- 3) Delusions, amnesia or confabulations concerning threat
- 4) Content of metaphor and idiom used

D. Clinical Diagnosis and Disposition

C O P Y